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1THE FOCUSED ATTENTION OF OTHERS: 
A CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE MODEL OF 
PERSONAL AND LEGAL PRIVACY 
 
I.  The Right to Be Let Alone 
 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  
They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and his intellect.  They knew 
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions 
of life are to be found in material things.  They sought 
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, 
as against the government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.1
Justice Brandeis saw the Constitution as conferring a substantive right 
that is both the most comprehensive, and most the most valued, of any in the 
document.  What is this remarkable right?  In the narrow context of United 
States v.  Olmstead, it appears to be the Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable search or seizure.  But Brandeis made a very similar 
argument in many of the same words thirty years earlier in a very famous and 
influential law journal article.2 In this earlier context the right is specifically 
identified as the right to privacy.  In both the law journal, where the focus was 
on the development of civil protection of privacy, and the constitutional case 
dealing with the Fourth Amendment, Brandeis characterized privacy in Judge 
Cooley’s terms - the right to be let alone.  What do we mean by a right to be let 
alone?  
2Except for a few very eccentric, and sometimes dangerous, individuals, no 
one desires to be let entirely alone.  Humans need friends, family, and social 
interaction.  Life, liberty, property, and happiness all depend on deeply complex 
social, commercial, legal, and moral interactions.  A culture, and this is probably 
an oxymoron, of hermits and recluses is the last thing civilized men or women 
would desire.  But, of course, Justice Brandeis knew this all along.  The right to 
be let alone was never imagined to be a normative directive to let individuals 
totally alone.  It articulates a value in letting people alone, in certain kinds of 
ways, and in limited contexts.  Exactly what these kinds of ways that people are 
entitled to be let alone are, or what precisely the contexts in which this 
entitlement holds, are the subject of great moral, legal, and constitutional 
controversy. 
In addition to his provocative identification of privacy with an entitlement 
to be let alone, Justice Brandeis makes a comparative assertion.  Not only is an 
individual’s interest in personal and constitutional privacy identified as a right, it 
is given pride of place as the most comprehensive and valued of rights.  This 
seems unlikely; privacy is not, nor has it ever been, the most valued of possible 
rights.  Most citizens, sad to say, don’t think enough about moral or legal rights 
to have an opinion one way or another.  Those who do are as likely to identify 
the Second Amendment, or a collective community right to law and order, as the 
most valuable.  Even as thoughtful and distinguished a jurist as Justice Black 
expresses an almost dismissive evaluation of the importance of privacy. 
3The Court talks about a constitutional “right of 
privacy” as though there is some constitutional 
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be 
passed which might abridge the “privacy” of 
individuals.  But there is not.  .  .  .  I like my privacy 
as well as the next one, but I am compelled to admit 
that government has a right to invade it unless 
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.3
Justice Brandeis’ concerns were not empirical, nor ethnographic.  His 
extraordinary claim is a normative one.  Privacy is a central, and perhaps 
essential, value in a genuinely liberal society.  I think he is quite correct in this 
judgment.  This remains bitterly controversial, however, not just because all 
normative and academic theses are controversial, but because we have such a 
fragile and imperfect understanding of the nature of personal and legal privacy, 
and an equally unclear vision of its social, legal, and moral importance.  An 
entitlement to be let alone is an intriguing normative directive in a liberal society, 
but one that raises as many questions as it answers.  In what sense are citizens 
entitled to be let alone?  And by whom?  And in what contexts?  An adequate 
theory of privacy must provide at least the bare outlines to these basic 
questions.  Further, assuming we can reach some consensus about the nature of 
privacy, there remain difficult questions about the sacrifices society can be 
expected to make in order to respect individual privacy.  Honoring personal 
privacy exacts a very real social cost.  How can we ever engage in the reflective 
balancing of the costs and benefits of protecting privacy when we have such a 
sketchy understanding of its place in the larger array of values and rights in 
contemporary liberal society? 
4My hope in the discussion to follow is at the same time unrealistically 
ambitious, and cautiously modest.  The modesty comes from the fact that I 
advocate no significant legal or conceptual change, and because, though I have 
strong feelings, which I make no special attempt to disguise, on the substantive 
moral, legal, and constitutional questions which surround privacy, I in no way 
see my own substantive views as any kind of logical outgrowth of my analysis.  
The ambition comes from the conceit of offering yet another model or analysis of 
personal and legal privacy.  Over forty years ago, Judge Biggs colorfully 
described the privacy literature as “a haystack in a hurricane.”4 The ensuing 
decades have seen a profusion of scholarly attention, and many new competing 
definitions, but nothing remotely resembling consensus.  I put forward an 
analysis of privacy here that is “mine” only in the sense that I take the credit and 
blame for the particular articulation and argumentative defense before you.  I 
believe that it is implicit, and sometimes explicit, in the work of a number of 
scholars.  I am confident that it is conceptually superior to competing models, 
but I have no illusions that it possesses some kind of magical analytic clarity that 
will immediately win over advocates for rival understandings of privacy.  My hope 
is that the community of scholars toiling in the fields of privacy will find some use 
for a somewhat systematic examination of recent developments, and for a 
concrete proposal for consideration and review. 
II.  Semantic Legislation 
Defining privacy requires a familiarity with its ordinary 
usage, of course, but this is not enough since our 
common ways of talking and using language are 
5riddled with inconsistencies, ambiguities, and 
paradoxes.  What we need is a definition which is by 
and large consistent with ordinary language, so that 
capable speakers of English will not be genuinely 
surprised that the term “privacy” should be defined in 
this way, but which also enables us to talk 
consistently, clearly, and precisely about the family of 
concepts to which privacy belongs.5
Since its very beginnings as a written discipline, philosophy has seen itself 
as fundamentally concerned with the analysis of thought and language.  This 
often leads to the caricature that philosophers only care about words.  Not true, 
of course.  We want to understand the nature of a concept like privacy, not 
because we want to compile new dictionary entries, but because we care about 
privacy, and laws and public policies that may enhance or threaten our privacy.  
But, some better understanding of privacy seems required for an informed and 
productive debate about those laws and public policies.  And it is hard to see 
how such conceptual improvement could come about without careful scholarly 
attention by philosophers, social scientists, and academic lawyers. 
Natural language is at times vague, ambiguous, and unclear.  Speakers 
misuse language.  Occasionally what appears to be a substantive dispute turns 
out to nothing more than a simple linguistic misunderstanding.  It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that scholars professionally trained to pay attention to 
language grow impatient and advocate linguistic reform and greater linguistic 
care.  The concept of privacy seems a natural for this sort of conceptual revision.  
W. A. Parent in the quote above is unapologetic in his call for a more precise 
definition of privacy. 
6Let us assume that Professor Parent’s call for linguistic reform is more 
than a rhetorical voice.  He is concerned, as are many privacy scholars, with 
rampant inconsistency, ambiguity, and paradox, in the colloquial and legal usage 
of the concept of privacy.  He proposes, therefore, a reformed definition of 
privacy that eliminates contradictory wordings, and resolves vague and 
ambiguous usages into clear and precise ones.  I am convinced that this sort of 
semantic legislation, no matter how well intentioned or easily sympathized with, 
is a futile philosophical undertaking.  There is clear value, of course, in 
scrupulously calling attention to ambiguity, vagueness, and contradiction.  If 
privacy is guilty of these conceptual sins (and I suspect most every interesting 
concept is to some degree), then there is an analytic obligation to point them 
out, and perhaps even to suggest ways of dealing with the problems.  But taking 
language that is widely used in inconsistent or ambiguous ways, or worrying 
about concepts that admit of borderline cases, and artificially redefining them by 
mandating a new, consistent, univocal, and precise usage is a waste of 
philosophical time and effort. 
Linguistic usage is certainly malleable.  But conceptual change is the 
product of generations of gradually evolving linguistic habits, not an abrupt, 
overnight cessation of old ways of thinking and speaking, and the adoption of 
new philosophically mandated ones to replace them.  I claim as a simple matter 
of empirical fact that such immediate linguistic change is psychologically and 
anthropologically impossible.  This fact, alone, has to raise serious doubts about 
7the whole approach of semantic legislation as a way of understanding 
philosophical analysis. 
Perhaps even more problematic for this perspective, however, is that 
semantic legislation would typically prove to be normatively futile.  The problem 
here is that philosophical analysis of normative concepts like privacy rarely takes 
place independently of larger political and moral questions.  Definitions of privacy 
are often used as premises in arguments for social and legal policies.  And the 
debates about these policies are always contentious.  Any recommended 
conceptual “improvement” will be readily embraced by partisans whose position 
will enhanced by the proposed semantic legislation.  But those on the opposite 
side, if they have their wits about them, will reject the proposal as not being an 
improvement at all, but rather as begging-the-question against them.  The 
existing substantive debate will find itself recast as a conceptual disagreement.  
And this is to be despaired, not simply because it will prove to be every bit as 
controversial as the original policy dispute, but also because it actually mis-
characterizes the real nature of the fight, and thus makes it even less likely that 
the opposing positions can find room for compromise, let alone resolution. 
III.  Information Models of Privacy 
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.6
A. Privacy and Information 
 
8In a literature that is often characterized as a complete absence of scholarly 
consensus, one finds surprising agreement concerning the centrality of 
information to the concept of personal privacy.  Although there is an initial 
plausibility to the claim that epistemological concepts like information, data, and 
knowledge form the analytic core of privacy, I contend that privacy should be 
understood in a very different fashion.  One part of my argument will be to show 
that there are many standard uses of privacy where informational concerns are 
either completely absent, or can only be included in artificial and contrived ways.  
I will concede that there are many other instances, however, where information 
does seem to be center stage.  My strategy, here, will be to suggest that 
although in these latter cases information and privacy are connected, the linkage 
is contingent, and neither analytically nor normatively central. 
The following is an example of a recent theory of privacy that received some 
scholarly attention in the 1980s.  I intend to be brutally harsh on it, but I must 
confess at the outset that it has great initial plausibility, and certainly possesses 
the theoretical virtues of clarity and elegance.  Nevertheless, I believe it can be 
shown to be conclusively false.  Perhaps falsity is an inappropriate charge, since 
Parent is candidly involved in semantic legislation.  Still, since he admits desiring 
a theory that is “by and large consistent with ordinary language,” and one that 
“enables us to talk clearly and precisely about the family of concepts to which 
privacy belongs,”7 I think it is fair to submit the theory to the challenge of 
potential counter-examples. 
9Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented 
personal knowledge of one possessed by others.  A 
person’s privacy is diminished exactly to the degree 
that others possess this kind of knowledge about him.  
. . . [P]ersonal information .  .  .  [should] be 
understood to consist of facts about a person which 
most individuals in a given society do not want widely 
known about themselves.8
As admirably clear as this model first appears, there are at least four 
components that demand further clarification.  Parent uses the concepts of 
knowledge and information as virtually synonymous.  In colloquial speech this 
reasonable enough, but in most philosophical contexts there are distinctions that 
deserve at least some mention.  Information, or facts, are impersonal, and 
although the data exists, it is quite possible that no one is aware of if.  I may 
“possess” a good deal of information about climate conditions in South America 
by owning a handy-dandy computer encyclopedia, though I never consult the 
relevant entries.  The F.B.I. may possess a good deal of data about you in one of 
their seldom accessed files.  Knowledge, however, is a much more dynamic 
epistemological concept.  According to what is sometimes called the standard 
analysis, to know something is to believe it, and to have good evidence for it, 
and for it to be true.  For Parent, as well as many of the information models, it is 
unclear whether information or knowledge is the real concern.  Has the F.B.I.  
violated your privacy if it has all the data about you, but never accesses it?  Not 
even the clerks who enter it?  Every one of us, even the most radical privacy 
hawks, would care more if the inappropriate personal data was known –  
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believed, thought about, considered, etc. – by others, than if it was just 
mechanically compiled.  This should alert us to something important, I believe. 
Obviously not any old question about you or your person counts as 
personal. Privacy, according to Parent, protects personal information.  His 
working definition of personal information is a helpful blend of example and 
generalized conceptual description. 
In contemporary America facts about a person’s 
sexual preferences, drinking or drug habits, income, 
the state of his or her marriage and health belong to 
the class of personal information.  Ten years from 
now some of these facts may be a part of everyday 
conversation; if so their disclosure would not diminish 
individual privacy.  [P]ersonal information .  .  .  [is] a 
function of existing cultural norms and social 
practices.9
So far, so good.  But then comes a surprising addition to the category of 
personal information.  One that at first just seems eccentric, but I believe is 
symptomatic of a more serious conceptual malady. 
[We must] accommodate a particular and unusual 
class of cases of the following sort.  Most of us don’t 
care if our height, say, is widely known.  But there 
are a few persons who are extremely sensitive about 
their height (or weight or voice pitch).  They might 
take extreme measures to ensure that other people 
do not find it out.  For such individuals height is a 
very personal matter.  Were someone to find it out by 
ingenious snooping we should not hesitate to talk 
about an invasion of privacy.10 
I think we would, indeed, describe this example as an invasion of privacy, but 
not because the information has idiosyncratically become personal, but rather 
because there has been ingenious, and we assume inappropriate, snooping.
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Once again we have advance warning that something besides information is at 
work in our concerns with personal privacy. 
Finally we come to the last, and least plausible, part of Parent’s model.  As 
with most aspects of this analysis, there is complete candor and philosophical 
purpose to its inclusion. 
My definition of privacy excludes knowledge of 
documented personal information.  I do this for a 
simple reason.  Suppose that A is browsing through 
some old newspapers and happens to see B’s name in 
a story about child prodigies who unaccountably 
failed to succeed as adults.  Should we accuse A of 
invading B’s privacy?  No.  An affirmative answer 
blurs the distinction between the public and the 
private.  What belongs to the public domain cannot 
without glaring paradox be called private; 
consequently it should not be incorporated within our 
concept of privacy.11 
I confess here to a simple intuitive disagreement.  I believe that the adolescent 
games engaged in by Bill and Monica were none of our business.  I think that 
their inclusion in the Special Prosecutor’s report was a violation of privacy.  Grant 
me the above, as they say, for the sake of argument.  Doesn’t it continue to 
violate their privacy every time their behavior is referred to again in the tabloids, 
or the evening news, or in monologues on late-night TV?  Parent’s category of 
undocumented personal information seems to put a kind of statute of limitations 
on violations of privacy.  I surreptitiously take a digital photo of you and your 
mistress.  I take it that we are agreed I have violated your privacy.  I post it on 
my webpage, I have further violated your privacy.  Is the picture now fair game? 
Is it permissible, now, for others to forward it indiscriminately.  Maybe my 
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webpage is obscure and rarely accessed, but Smith’s is prestigious and 
everybody clicks in.  Doesn’t Smith further violate your privacy, perhaps even 
more seriously than I did, when she uploads the photo onto hers?  The issues 
raised here are more subtle than the simple dismissal that “what belongs to the 
public domain cannot without glaring paradox be called private.” 
Most introductory logic books contain ordinary language paraphrases for 
the sentential connectives in the first-order propositional calculus.  The 
relationship of biconditionality that we typically see in the classical form of 
conceptual analysis is indicated in colloquial speech by the phrases “if and only 
if,” or “just in case.” I know of no intro book that includes the phrase “exactly to 
the degree that.” I am assuming, nevertheless, that Parent intends this strong 
logical connection.  His model of personal privacy, then, can be reconstructed as 
follows. 
A’s privacy is violated by B iff: 
 
• B possesses personal knowledge (or information) about A (without 
A’s consent). 
 
• The personal knowledge about A is undocumented. 
 
This model possesses many conceptual virtues - relative clarity, simplicity, and 
perhaps even initial plausibility.  Its biggest vice, unfortunately, that it seriously 
mischaracterizes the nature and importance of personal privacy.  I will use the 
method of counter-examples to make my case.   
B. Three Kinds of Counter-Examples 
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I will be presenting three distinct sorts of counter-examples to Parent’s 
model of personal privacy.  Any one of these would be adequate for the narrow 
task of demonstrating the model’s inadequacy, of course, but it is interesting to 
see the different ways it fails to capture some of our deepest feelings about 
privacy.  My ultimate goal is to suggest that these categories of counter-
examples pose profound explanatory hurdles for any type of information based 
analysis of privacy.  And may even prove useful in pointing the way to more 
plausible accounts of the concept. 
The first class of cases involve failed attempts to uncover information, 
including undocumented personal information.  You and I are both candidates 
for the department chair.  You suspect that I engage in unprofessional conduct 
with female students in the privacy of my office, and that by documenting it to 
the Dean you can sabotage my candidacy.  You bribe the custodian, gain access 
to my office late one night, and install hidden microphones and video cameras.  
Bad luck for you.  In the two weeks you monitor my office I contract the flu, and 
never make it into work.  The job is announced, neither of us gets it, and you 
remove the equipment before I recover and return to school.  According to 
Parent’s model, you do not violate my privacy by your actions.  After all, you 
clearly do not possess undocumented personal information about me.  You do 
know that I haven’t been into work, but that information is not personal, and is 
well-documented with all of our colleagues.  You possess data about how messy 
my office is, but again, that’s not particularly personal, and is so well-
documented within the campus community that I am famous for my untidy 
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ways.  Have you perhaps simply attempted to violate my privacy, but failed? 
Your devious plan is certainly a spectacular failure, but you have succeeded, 
beautifully, in violating my privacy.  It would be way too easy on you to allow 
you to plead to the lesser moral charge of merely attempting to violate my 
privacy.  I know of no way of establishing this clear intuition on my part other 
than asking you to imagine yourself as the victim.  Isn’t your outrage, supposing 
that you somehow find out about the surveillance, that of someone who has 
actually been harmed, not that of someone who has luckily avoided it? 
The second class of counter-examples seeks to even more drastically 
sever the connection between privacy and information.  You are my research 
assistant.  I believe that you have great academic promise, and I also presume 
to know you well enough to make judgments about your future happiness.  You 
tell me of your plans to delay your dissertation and get married.  I’m convinced 
the guy’s a loser, and that you will be terribly unhappy; I’m also devastated that 
you would potentially abandon such bright academic prospects.  Though many 
might disagree, I do not believe that it would be a violation of your privacy for 
me to share my misgivings with you as a friend and mentor.  But suppose I just 
can’t let go of it.  I continually lecture you on what a mistake you are about to 
make, how you are throwing away your future, and how miserable you will be.  
Surely, now, I have intruded on things that are “none of my business.” 
I am convinced that this is a very central case of violating someone’s 
privacy.  Focus on knowledge or information, however, seems to completely miss 
the normative point.  It is true, of course, that you could have protected yourself 
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from my meddling by keeping your plans secret.  There is what we might call an 
empirical link between personal privacy and blocks on information and 
knowledge in many cases like the above.  If you hide your plans from me, keep 
them secret, treat them as confidential, you will no doubt spare yourself from my 
butting in.  But the violation of your privacy is not what I know, or data that I 
have come to possess.  It is what I do.  I violate your privacy by being a 
presumptuous busybody. 
The last class of counter-examples explores the delicate topics of sexuality 
and nudity.  More than one privacy scholar has commented on the archaic 
sounding expression “private parts” as a euphuism for genitals.  Our bodies, 
particularly in states of undress, as well as our sex lives, are preeminent areas of 
personal privacy.  Yet, information models totally miss the point of the privacy 
concerns associated with sexuality, excretion, and nudity.  Consider two nice 
examples from the recent literature.  First from Julie Inness. 
[W]hen a peeping Tom looks in a person’s window for 
the second time, it is conceivable that he might 
acquire absolutely no new information about the 
victim.  Despite this failure, the peeping Tom clearly 
violates the victim’s privacy with the second, as well 
as the first, inspection.  When he is charged with the 
second violation, he cannot escape with the 
explanation, “I’ve seen it all before!”12 
And a second from Judith DeCew. 
 
Consider a man who knows his wife’s body very well 
but is now divorced from her and spying on her as 
she takes a bath.  It is difficult to deny that her 
privacy is being invaded.13 
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The power of these little counter-examples seems to derive from the fact 
that “knowledge” of the appearance of the victim’s body is in some sense 
“documented.” And since Parent’s analysis explicitly includes the condition that 
the “information” be undocumented, they constitute profound, and I would 
argue, fatal, problems for the model.  I would go further, however.  What about 
Inness’s voyeur on his first visit to his victim’s window?  Surely he has violated 
her privacy.  Has he gained undocumented personal information?  Perhaps, but I 
suggest that any information or knowledge is completely incidental to the 
offense, and that it totally misrepresents the victim’s concern.  She cares that the 
privacy of her home has been compromised, and that she has been stared at in a 
state of undress, and not that something secret or confidential has been 
discovered.  Thus, I am pressing the point that cases of voyeurism count as 
serious counter-examples to Parent’s analysis quite independently of the number 
of times one has been victimized. 
C.  More Modest Information Models of Privacy  
 
An attack on a very specific conceptual model can be a cowardly strategy.  
So what if the precise formulation suggested by Parent can be shown to be 
inadequate?  The philosophical critic earns some small analytical points by 
systematically marshaling her counter examples, but does this in anyway show 
that the initial intuition is conceptually flawed?  Many scholars, perhaps even a 
majority of them, have seen something analytically central between the concepts 
of information and privacy.  The more interesting analyses attempt to articulate 
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this connection in more modest and plausible forms.  Consider, for example, the 
following from Richard Wasserstrom. 
It is apparent that there are a number of different 
claims that can be made in the name of privacy.  A 
number - and perhaps all - of them involve the 
question of the kind and degree of control that a 
person ought to be able to exercise in respect to 
knowledge or the disclosure of information about 
himself or herself.  That is not all there is to privacy, 
but it is surely one central theme.14 
Is information even analytically central to the concept of privacy?  If the 
literature is to be trusted, the consensus must be an unqualified yes.  And to the 
degree that the intuitions of casual speakers are relevant, the answer is again in 
the affirmative.  Perhaps, therefore, it is nothing more than an exercise in 
semantic legislation to quarrel with such widespread agreement.  Still, I see no 
escape from the fact that the analysis so far shows that there remain central 
cases of gross violations of privacy that have little or nothing to do with 
information. 
This is clearest in cases like the overbearing mentor.  The research 
assistant’s decisions about marriage, her education, and perhaps her career are 
none of his business.  His initial advice may have been appropriate, but his 
incessant lecturing is clearly wrong.  The normative breach in these kinds of 
cases has nothing to do with knowledge, but with attempts to influence certain 
kinds of decisions and behavior.  These sorts of intrusions into people’s lives 
constitute a very serious violation of personal privacy. 
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Very similar considerations explain why we so naturally describe formal 
actions on the part of institutions and government that restrict choice as 
violations of privacy.  When the law presumes to restrict the use of contraceptive 
devices it intrudes on individuals’ privacy. 
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to 
bear or beget a child.15 
We have already seen that information is related to these sorts of privacy 
violations in a contingent manner.  If the research assistant keeps her plans 
secret, she effectively blocks the intrusion from her mentor.  If single and 
married individuals only clandestinely obtain and use birth control devices, they 
have little to fear from government.  But even this concedes too much to 
information analyses.  Why should the graduate student have to keep her plans 
secret?  Indeed, she wanted to share the exciting news with her mentor.  The 
Connecticut and Massachusetts laws in Griswold and Eisenstadt make this point 
even more directly.  Why should married or single individuals have to take any 
risk of being caught, or suffer the inconvenience of the black market to secure 
their contraceptives?  Government has no business in this aspect of a person’s 
life. 
I have already argued that the very complex, and clearly socially 
constructed, conventions regarding sexuality, nudity, and the like cannot be 
adequately captured by the concepts of information and knowledge.  Any 
temptation to treat these issues in informational terms simply places an 
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unrealistic emphasis on the sensory nature of the violation.  It is true that 
sensory modalities are our primary, if not only, means of acquiring information.  
It is equally true that the voyeur, or the pervert who listens in as you and your 
lover engage in sex, depends upon his senses for his cheap thrills.  But the goal 
of the watching or listening is not informational, and the offense felt by the 
victims has nothing to do with any potential knowledge that might be 
illegitimately gained. 
The force of these examples is very different than when they were first 
applied to Parent.  The modest approach is not committed to information being 
logically necessary, nor sufficient, for the concept privacy.  The counter 
examples, therefore, do not refute the model.  They do pose, however, what I 
have called explanatory hurdles.  Information is hypothesized as a central, 
indeed the central, analytic component in privacy.  Yet there are at least two 
sorts of standard privacy violations that have little, if anything, to do with 
knowledge or information.  This has to give at least some pause for thought. 
C. Information and the Judgment of Others 
 
Perhaps the virtues of information models can only truly be appreciated by 
focusing on the admittedly numerous cases where privacy and the control of 
personal information does seem center stage.  Let us turn our attention to some 
instances of privacy that seem to intrinsically involve epistemological concepts of 
knowledge and information.  Most of us in this culture consider facts and data 
about the following aspects of our lives very personal and private. 
• Our health and medical records 
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• Our finances 
• Lifestyle choices such as our use of drugs and alcohol 
• Details about our closest personal relationships 
• Almost any occurrences within the “privacy” of our homes 
• Creative endeavors like poetry or painting 
We may, of course, voluntarily chose to share this personal information with 
others - the finance company when we apply for a loan, guests invited into our 
homes, or our paintings when they are displayed at the county fair.  But the 
choice is ours; we are entitled to block others from having this knowledge about 
us, and to feel profound moral and legal outrage when they illegitimately come 
to possess it. 
It is indeed natural to describe the privacy concerns above in 
informational terms.  I have been arguing for two decades, however, that 
information and knowledge is not our “real” concern.16 To take a couple of 
examples from the little laundry list above - I desire to shelter information about 
my drinking, lest you consider me a drunk; my poetry is confidential, since I 
have no desire to be laughed at.  My general thesis has been that there is an 
obvious empirical connection between information and judgment.  On the basis 
of personal information (both reliable and unreliable) others may form judgments 
about us.  Perhaps the most effective way of ensuring that others not 
illegitimately judge us is to block their access to personal information.  Thus, I 
claim, in a world where individuals were truly granted a limited and culturally 
defined immunity from the judgment of others, we would have little, if any, 
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concern about others possessing information about us within this limited sphere 
of our lives. 
The immunity from the judgment of others hypothesis nicely captures our 
privacy concerns with respect to government.  The Fourth Amendment grants us 
immunity from the judgment of the state with respect to our persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.  Rather than warrants and probable cause providing shields 
that allow for criminal activity, the Fourth Amendment protects the innocent, 
honorable, and law-abiding.  We are all granted immunity from government’s 
moral and legal judgment within these most private aspects of our personal 
environment.  In addition, we are granted immunity from judgment with respect 
to certain personal decisions and actions.  It was none of the overbearing 
mentor’s business what his research assistant decided to do with her life.  Recent 
constitutional law has similarly recognized that it is none of government’s 
business what citizens decide to do with respect to birth control, unwanted 
pregnancies, or consensual adult sexual encounters.  Many of us believe, though 
the Supreme Court has yet to agree, that it is none of government’s business 
what the gender of citizens desiring to marry is, or choices to end one’s life in 
the face of medical considerations.  Here it is very clear, I believe, that our 
privacy concerns are not with government having knowledge that we have 
secured an abortion, are seeking homosexual marriage, or exercised our right to 
die, but that we insist that government not judge us, that it not criminalize or 
prohibit these personal choices and behavior. 
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The judgment of others hypothesis has the advantage of changing the 
focus from the passive epistemological states of others, to the much more active 
affective cognitive states of others.  Most of us immediately recognize how 
discomforting it can be to be judged by others in those limited contexts where 
we expect immunity.  I remain confident, therefore, that the immunity from the 
judgment of others account is explanatorily superior to information models in 
many contexts.  I think it does a much better job of uncovering the source of our 
own reactions to violations of our privacy. 
Unfortunately, many of the examples I have brought to bear against 
information models apply with almost equal force to the immunity from the 
judgment of others approach.  There is nothing intrinsically judgmental about 
voyeurism, for example.  And, in fact, much of what we might call casual 
snooping can be done from a non-judgmental perspective - maybe I’m just 
curious about how much money you make.  The move to the affective attitudes 
of others, rather than the passive state of their knowledge, remains a useful 
insight into the analytic core of personal privacy.  But when all is said and done, 
immunity from the judgment of others only captures a part of the concept of 
privacy, and it seems worthwhile to continue the quest for a more all-inclusive 
analysis. 
IV.  Cluster Theories of Privacy 
 
The right to privacy is another example.  We value 
privacy; and what we think of as the right to privacy 
is a cluster of rights that protect it.  But here it seems 
to me there is much slithering in the literature: not 
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only is the scope of this right unclear, it is unclear 
what is even at the heart of it. 
But there are no sharp boundaries around any 
of the cluster-rights, even those much clearer than is 
that of the right to privacy.17 
A. The Diversity of Privacy 
 
The concept of personal privacy encompasses a daunting array of cases.  
Most of us expect some protection from the following sorts of invasions. 
• Having our offices or homes monitored . 
• The spying of peeping-Toms 
• Having our medical or financial records perused by others. 
• Having personal information published in the tabloids. 
• Having well-meaning, but overbearing, mentors lecture us on career or 
marriage. 
 
• Unreasonable searches by the police. 
 
• “[U]nwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the right to bear or beget a child.”18 
Much of the privacy literature assumes some core notion that unites this wide 
collection of moral, legal, and constitutional concerns.  But, perhaps, we are not 
dealing with a single concept, or right, at all, but a complex amalgamation of 
legal and moral immunities misleadingly assembled under a single rubric. 
This hypothesis has two immediate theoretical advantages.  It offers a 
very straightforward account of the past one hundred years of privacy 
scholarship.  No wonder the literature is in such disarray.  It would be like trying 
to offer a definition of the concept of a bank that simultaneously included 
financial institutions, sides of rivers, and elevated turns in the roadway.  
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Furthermore, if the philosopher or academic lawyer is freed from the 
responsibility of offering all-inclusive analyses, perhaps genuine headway can be 
made concerning concrete issues like, the confidentiality of medical records, or a 
better understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be 
reasonable.  Although the case for abandoning the search for a unified analysis 
of personal privacy is potentially strong, the traditional goal of articulating an all-
encompassing model of such an important moral and legal notion also seems 
worth pursuing.  We must, therefore, briefly examine a couple of recent 
arguments for abandoning the traditional approach. 
B. Thomson’s Derivative Theory  
 
According to Judith Jarvis Thomson the only clarity in the privacy 
literature is its unclarity. 
Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to 
privacy is that nobody seems to have a very clear 
idea what it is.19 
She then goes on to offer a very concrete diagnosis of why there has 
been such widespread confusion.  Indeed, she suggests three related sources of 
our analytical befuddlement.  First is our fragile understanding of the concept of 
privacy.  Second, and equally important, are the pervasive misunderstandings 
concerning rights, in general.  And, third, the hypothesis that we are not really 
dealing with a univocal concept at all when we worry about the right to privacy. 
It begins to suggest itself, then, as a simplifying 
hypothesis, that the right to privacy is itself a cluster 
of rights, and that it is not a distinct cluster of rights 
but itself intersects with the cluster of rights which 
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the right over the person consists in and also with the 
cluster of rights which owning property consists in.20 
Professor Thomson is well-known among professional philosophers for the 
grace of her prose, and particularly, for her inspired use of thought-experiments 
as rhetorical devices for arguing a conceptual case.  She begins with a good one.  
She and her husband are having a fight that is very loud and they have 
carelessly left the windows open.  I stop to listen.  This is not very nice of me, 
perhaps it is even morally wrong, but I do not violate their rights.  In contrast 
she asks us to consider a slightly different scenario.  She and her husband are 
again fighting, but much quieter, and with the windows closed.  You listen to 
them by training an amplifier on the house.  You have violated their right to 
privacy.  Thomson sees the normative difference between these cases as a 
conceptual datum, a starting point for discussion.  I’m not completely convinced, 
but let’s grant her point.  By her own account we are not really discussing the 
nature of personal privacy, but what is involved in having a (moral) right - in this 
case the right to privacy.  These are very different issues.  Thomson implicitly 
concedes that both examples potentially concern privacy, why else explicitly 
contrast them?  She further concedes that normative conventions cover both 
cases.  Suppose she is right that I do not violate anyone’s rights by listening to 
the louder fight.  I can’t be arrested or sued, for example.  I still may intrude on 
her and husband’s privacy.  Indeed, I will be arguing that is precisely why what I 
have done is not very nice, and probably wrong. 
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Her account of why the second case of listening to the fight is a violation 
of the right to privacy, and the first case is at worst an intrusion upon privacy, 
depends on an analogy with personal property - in her delightful example, a 
particularly great pornographic picture.  As with anything you own, you have 
certain concrete rights that derive from the general right to property.  Thus, you 
have a right that your pornographic picture not be taken from you, damaged, or 
even looked at by others without your permission - though if your “picture is 
good pornography, it would be pretty mingy of [you] to keep it permanently 
hidden so that nobody but [you] shall ever see it - a nicer person would let his 
friends have a look too.”21 If I tear your picture up, I violate an “ungrand” right 
of yours not to have your pornographic pictures destroyed; one that derives from 
your right to property.  If I train my long distance X-ray device on your wall safe 
where you keep the picture squirreled away, I violate your “ungrand” right not to 
have your porn looked at by others.  We describe this latter case as deriving 
from your right to privacy, but Thomson claims its source is really the right to 
property. 
Thomson argues that we also possess a general right “over our own 
person.” Your specific rights over your left knee, to again poach one of her 
examples, is not exactly a property right - you didn’t buy it, though you could sell 
it except for the problem of, “who’d buy a used left knee?”22 This “grand” right 
leads to several specific “ungrand” rights - the right not to have your left knee 
damaged, or stroked, or if you’re shy, even looked at.  When it comes to 
immunity from having your knee damaged, this ungrand right derives from your 
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right over your own person.  According to Thomson, in the case of the knee 
being looked at, and perhaps simply touched, as well, we are tempted to derive 
the protection from the right to privacy, but it just as likely comes from this 
general right over our own person. 
Now rights to both property, and over one’s person, are not inalienable; 
they can be waived, sold, given away, or carelessly non-enforced.  You do not 
violate my right to property if you take home the pornographic photograph that I 
carelessly left on the bus, neither do you violate my right to property (and 
perhaps privacy) if you simply look at it there on the bus seat.  Similarly with the 
left knee, if you carelessly leave it exposed for all the world to see, we violate no 
right of yours - neither over your person, nor a right of privacy - if we all take a 
good look.  This is the crux of her argument about listening to the fight between 
her and her husband.  By leaving the window open and screaming at the top of 
their lungs, they have carelessly given away, or at least not take proper steps to 
protect their right to privacy. 
All of this is merely sets the stage for the derivative thesis.  Thomson 
correctly sees that merely re-describing situations involving the right to privacy in 
language that doesn’t use the concept, or even in terms of differing normative 
entitlements, does not establish the thesis that there is no distinct right to 
privacy. 
The fact, supposing it is a fact, that every right in the 
right-to-privacy cluster is also in some other rights 
cluster does not by itself show that the right to 
privacy is in any plausible sense a “derivative” right.  
A more important point seems to me to be this: the 
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fact that we have a right to privacy does not explain 
our having any of the rights in the right to privacy 
cluster.  .  .  .  I have a right that my pornographic 
picture not be torn.  Why?  Because it’s mine, 
because I own it.  .  .  .  But I don’t have a right not 
to be looked at because I have a right to privacy; I 
don’t have a right that no one shall torture me in 
order to get personal information about me because I 
have a right to privacy; one is inclined, rather, to say 
that it is because I have these rights that I have a 
right to privacy.23 
There are a number of rights that I possess that I would have naively 
taken to be explained by a more general right to privacy.  These include, at 
least, the following. 
• I have a right not to be looked at (in certain culturally 
defined contexts). 
 
• I have a right not to have personal information about me 
published. 
 
• I have a right not to be unreasonably searched. 
 
• I have a right not to have fundamentally important decisions 
interfered with. 
 
Why?  According to the derivative hypothesis this is not because of any general 
right to privacy - that’s an illusion.  Rather, if a right to privacy exists at all, it is 
because of these, and other equally specific, rights. 
Couldn’t an argument of the same form be constructed for any general 
right?  Consider some specific property rights. 
• I have a right that my car not be “borrowed” without my 
permission. 
• I have a right that my articles on privacy not be copied. 
29
• I have a right that my acreage in the woods not be trespassed 
upon. 
• I have a right to will my patent on my invention to my nephew. 
• I have a right to sell my used left knee. 
Suppose a derivative theorist of property were to claim that no general right to 
property explains the specific rights, but rather it is the specific rights that give 
us the general right to property.  In one sense, this is exactly right.  General 
concepts in the law usually come from specific cases.  But, it also seems 
genuinely explanatory to account for these specific rights in terms of a general 
right to property. 
This is exactly the response I want to give to the derivative account of the 
right to privacy.  In one helpful sense, the general right to privacy does derive 
from specific cases.  But that does not mean that it is unhelpful, or non-
explanatory, to account for those very same specific cases by appealing to a 
general right to privacy.  Particularly, if some unified theory of the abstract 
nature of privacy is forthcoming.  The fallacy here is to assume that conceptual 
explanation can only work in one direction.  Such a view of explanation is 
plausible in the case of causal accounts, but much less plausible in moral 
philosophy or jurisprudence. 
Thomson’s argument, after all, is not about privacy, but about the right to 
privacy.  It is easy enough, however, to imagine what a derivative theory of the 
nature of privacy would look like.  No one has a clear idea of what privacy is.  
The only thing that unites different examples of privacy is that we use the term, 
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“privacy,” to describe them.  This, of course, is possible, but I think extremely 
implausible.  Privacy scholars have found it extremely difficult to articulate a 
simple elegant theory of the nature of privacy - that’s almost a truism.  But, it 
hardly follows that there is nothing other than our use of the concept that unifies 
the varied privacy concerns.  I remain optimistic that there is, indeed, something 
that brings together the different moral, legal, and constitutional concerns that 
we use the language of privacy to characterize. 
C. DeCew’s Multifacited Model of Privacy 
 
Judith DeCew’s very interesting and useful analysis of privacy candidly 
attempts to split the difference between the derivative approach championed by 
Thomson, and the narrow “unitary” approach favored by Parent.  Almost 
everyone who has reflected on personal and legal privacy has been struck with 
how varied its uses are in moral and legal contexts.  At the same time, we do 
find the use of a single concept linguistically natural.  An approach to privacy 
that acknowledges both of these conceptual data has a lot of initial plausibility. 
We have seen that it is not possible to give a unique, 
unitary definition of privacy that covers all the diverse 
privacy interests.  The other extreme - abandoning 
the notion of privacy as meaningless or completely 
derivative from other interests such as property or 
bodily security - is equally untenable.  My approach, 
therefore, is to take a middle course.  .  .  .  I defend 
privacy as a broad and multifaceted cluster concept, 
[and] mark out the contexts where it is natural to 
view privacy as crucial.24 
DeCew characterizes privacy as a “cluster concept,” and Thomson also 
referred to the “privacy cluster.” This notion is familiar to contemporary 
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philosophers, and is originally associated with the work of Wittgenstein.  He 
claimed that not every concept could be analyzed in terms of a simple set of 
logically necessary and sufficient conditions that succinctly articulated the 
essence of the concept, and he made his point with the famous example of 
games. 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call 
“games”.  I mean board-games, card games, ball-
games, Olympic games, and so on.  What is common 
to them all? - Don’t say: “There must be something 
common, or that would not be called ‘games’” - but 
look and see whether there is anything common to 
all.  - For if you look at them you will not see 
something common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.  …  
[T]he result of this examination is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail… 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterize 
these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the 
various resemblances between members of a family: 
build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.  
etc.  overlap and criss-cross in the same way.  - And I 
shall say: ‘games’ form a family.25 
Such a view of philosophical analysis was quite popular in the 50s, 60s, 
and 70s, and is much less utilized in contemporary work.  It is, however, 
commonly accepted that some concepts form a cluster or family.  It is not at all 
unreasonable to see privacy in such a light.  Much more controversial, however, 
is the claim that cluster concepts have nothing in common besides family 
resemblances.  It remains to be seen whether privacy has a single unifying core 
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that can be articulated in an all encompassing analysis.  As Wittgenstein correctly 
saw, I believe, this is a quasi-empirical matter. 
Conceptual analysts have reason to be optimistic that unifying models are 
possible.  The trick is to put into words what we see.  If we recognize a family 
resemblance between Aunt Sarah and her nephew, what is it?  Card games, 
board games, Olympic games, children’s games, may have something in 
common, again, what is it?   Violations of personal and legal privacy - voyeurism, 
snooping, appropriating one’s image, searching without a warrant, denying the 
authority to make fundamentally important decisions - may have something in 
common, the challenge is to articulate this simple common feature.  We may 
have had very limited success and this may lead to modesty and pessimism 
regarding future attempts.  But it certainly does not follow that the task is 
impossible.  If the cluster analysis is the best we can do, so be it.  There’s plenty 
to be learned from good family resemblance analyses.  But, I want to have 
another go at a more unified model, one that says something about why these 
varied examples of privacy violations are all correctly put under the same 
conceptual umbrella. 
V.  Gavison’s Access Model 
 
Our interest in privacy is related to our concern over 
our accessability to others: the extent to which we 
are known to others, the extent to which others have 
physical access to us, and the extent to which we are 
the subject of others attention.26 
A.  Value Neutrality and Perfect Privacy 
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Ruth Gavison offers perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of the 
concepts of personal and legal privacy in the current literature.  She begins with 
a straightforward rejection of the derivative theory, or what she calls reductionist 
analyses, of the sort proposed by Thomson.  Privacy is a useful notion, she 
argues.  But how could it have such obvious utility in everyday and legal 
contexts, if it did not possess a coherent conceptual core?  Philosophers and 
academic lawyers may have had a difficult time producing an adequate model, 
but that should not lead to abandonment of the project, only more hard 
analytical work. 
Gavison argues that an adequate philosophical and legal analysis of 
privacy will need to demonstrate three distinct sorts of conceptual coherence.  It 
will need to provide satisfying general answers to three related, but obviously 
different, sorts of questions. 
• What is privacy?  How can we identify losses of privacy when 
they have occurred? 
 
• Why is privacy normatively important?  Why are losses of 
privacy undesirable? 
 
• Why is privacy legally important?  Why should privacy enjoy 
legal protection? 
 
Answers to the latter questions are logically dependent on answers to the 
former.  Thus, we must first discover the nature of personal privacy, before we 
will be in a position to say anything informative about its normative importance, 
or its legitimate place within liberal legal theory. 
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Since we must carefully distinguish the purely analytical question of what 
privacy is, from the normative question of why it is important, Gavison insists on 
a strong form of value neutrality as a basic criterion for conceptual analysis.  To 
the degree that conceptual models should have utility to disputants on both sides 
of great moral controversies, the insistence that we not beg any interesting 
moral questions is essential.  A model of privacy that could only be endorsed by 
those holding a pro-choice position, for example, would be of little value in 
helping to clarify questions of privacy and abortion rights.  Gavison, however, is 
seeking something even purer in terms of normative impartiality.  She aspires to 
an analysis of privacy that can be stated without the use of any normative 
notions whatsoever.  She, therefore, dismisses the idea that privacy is a right, a 
claim, a form of control, or a value, and insists that it must be an empirical 
situation. 
The desire not to preempt our inquiry about the value 
of privacy by adopting a value-laden concept at the 
outset is sufficient to justify viewing privacy as a 
situation of an individual vis-a-vie others, or as a 
condition of life.27 
The logical nature of such an objective condition of privacy is first approached 
through a thought-experiment.  Rather than reflecting on everyday examples of 
privacy, she asks her readers to imagine total, or what she calls perfect, privacy - 
a condition of complete isolation. 
In its most suggestive sense, privacy is a limitation of 
others’ access to an individual.  As a methodological 
starting point, I suggest that an individual enjoys 
perfect privacy when he is completely inaccessible to 
others.  This may be broken down into three 
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independent components: in perfect privacy no one 
has information about X, no one pays any attention to 
X, and no one has physical access to X.28 
Being stranded alone on a desert island, or locked in solitary confinement, or 
trapped in a spacecraft that is hurtling out of control into the void, are conditions 
of increased privacy, since others have no information about you, nor have 
physical access to you, nor pay attention to you.  These examples strike us as 
odd because none of us want to be stranded on desert islands, locked in solitary, 
or hurtling into the void, but we all place great personal value on the enjoyment 
of our privacy.  Gavison is well aware that there is something counterintuitive in 
all of this. 
We start from the obvious fact that both perfect 
privacy and total loss of privacy are undesirable.  
Individuals must be in some intermediate state - a 
balance between privacy and interaction - in order to 
maintain human relations, develop their capacities 
and sensibilities, create and grow, and even to 
survive.  Privacy thus cannot be said to be a value in 
the sense that the more people have of it, the better.  
In fact, the opposite may be true.29 
Something is surely amiss, here.  For one thing, unless the condition of 
perfect privacy has been continual since birth, even complete isolation does not 
guarantee that one’s privacy cannot be violated.  A disreputable publisher could 
choose to print a gossipy account of your earlier life while you are stranded on 
the desert island.  The publishers, as well as thousands of readers, could 
compromise your privacy by finding amusement in the article.  Perhaps even 
more surprising, however, is that privacy is characterized as being at odds with 
human relationships, the growth of individual capacities and sensibilities; it even 
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threatens survival.  It is a situation that must be balanced with social interaction.  
Most of the literature sees privacy in a very different light.  Rather than a 
problem for individual growth and the establishment of important human 
relationships, the prevailing view is that privacy is a necessary condition for their 
establishment and maintenance.30 
B.  Coherence and Independence 
 
Although, “[p]rivacy is a term with many meanings,”31 Gavison is 
committed to finding a coherent conceptual core.  This core can be expressed 
“suggestively” as “a limitation of others’ access to an individual.”32 But as we will 
see directly, in many privacy violations, the idea of limited access is at best a 
metaphor.  To discover the non-metaphorical nature of privacy it is necessary to 
consider three distinct, and logically independent characteristics of privacy.  
Thus, Gavison proposes a cluster analysis of privacy, though she never uses the 
Wittgensteinian notion.  Privacy is a concept with an identifiable “family 
resemblance” that gives it conceptual coherence, but with characteristics that are 
logically independent in the sense that none are individually logically necessary, 
nor sufficient. 
The concept of privacy suggested here is a complex 
of these three independent and irreducible elements: 
secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.  Each is 
independent in the sense that a loss of privacy may 
occur through a change in any one of the three, 
without a necessary loss in either of the other two.  
The concept is nevertheless coherent because the 
three are all part of the same notion of accessibility, 
and are related in many important ways.33 
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I have already conceded that a well-executed cluster analysis can be of 
great philosophical value.  It may seem caviling, therefore, to quarrel with 
Gavison’s model, particularly since I believe that it contains most of what we 
need to know about personal and legal privacy.  My worries are twofold.  I am 
unconvinced that any of the elements above—secrecy, anonymity, or solitude—
are essential components of personal privacy.  They are useful devices for the 
protection of privacy, but not analytically central.  Secondly, I believe that the 
entire analytic strategy got off on the wrong foot by a serious misrepresentation 
of the needs and standards for normative neutrality within conceptual models.  
Nevertheless, I remain optimistic that by teasing apart the very useful collection 
of insights within the accessability to others model, we may yet discover a single 
non-metaphorical characteristic that unites the central cases of privacy violation. 
C.  Gavison’s Three Characteristics of Privacy 
 
Characteristic One—Information known about an individual.  One 
way that others can gain access to us is through information they have about us.  
Obviously, we are dealing with an extended, or metaphorical, sense of gaining 
access.  If Madonna is vacationing in Australia, and my access to her is a cheesy 
tabloid article I am reading about her here in the Pacific Northwest, then the sort 
of epistemological access in Gavison’s first characteristic of privacy has nothing 
to do with physical space.  Still, the metaphor has resonance, I have gained 
access to her life in ways that potentially implicate her privacy. 
Gavison noted, in 1980, “the most lively privacy issue now discussed is 
related to information-gathering.”34 The observation is even more applicable in 
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our post-9/11 world.  Any adequate account of personal privacy will have to 
naturally accommodate the centrality of our normative concerns with the control 
of personal information.  Gavison’s model does this nicely by addressing 
information twice over - once through the metaphor of access by others, and 
then again, literally, as an independent and irreducible element. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of Gavison’s appeal to information as 
conceptually central to privacy is that the standard gambit of attacking by 
counter-example is effectively blocked.  Information and knowledge is merely 
one method of gaining access to another.  It, therefore, counts for very little that 
we can enumerate clear cases of privacy violations that have little or nothing to 
do with knowledge possessed by others.  It would, of course, count against the 
model if most of our worries about personal privacy had nothing to do with 
information, but as we have seen, many of them clearly do.  It may seem, 
therefore, that the inclusion of information as conceptually relevant to privacy, 
but neither logically necessary nor sufficient, is just what the doctor ordered. 
I stand by my earlier critique of information models, but I concede the 
challenge posed by Gavison’s strategy.  I must now restrict my argument almost 
entirely to an appeal to my readers’ intuitions about violations of their own 
privacy.  Suppose, for example, that you were the unfortunate victim in the 
following situation. 
If secrecy is not treated as an independent element of 
privacy, then the following [is] only [one] of the 
situations that will not be considered [a] loss of 
privacy: …  an estranged wife who publishes her 
husband’s love letters to her, without his consent.35 
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I take it we all agree that you have a normative complaint here, at least in part 
because you privacy has been violated.  Setting aside other moral concerns like 
the clear breaking of trust, what is so distressing about the love letters being 
made public?  We can imagine circumstances, of course, where some crucial 
confidential fact is disclosed, but in most cases our worries have nothing to do 
with personal information.  You might even desire that others know that you are 
capable of composing mushy proclamations of your undying affection, since this 
shows that you have a romantic side to your personality.  But you would still 
consider the letters private.  Gavison addresses the publication of the love letters 
as an instance of “information known about an individual,” but I would say that 
the case more appropriately turns on the attention of others.  As the readers 
amuse themselves with your intimate bearing of your soul, you feel violated 
because they are focusing their attention on you, and a part of your life that our 
culture recognizes as private.  As I have said numerous times in this discussion, 
any facts or knowledge gained by the reader are incidental, and quite beside the 
normative point.  And all of this is perfectly compatible with the observation that 
keeping the love letters secret will quite effectively spare you the distress.   
Characteristic Two—Physical access to an individual.  There is, of 
course, an obviously non-metaphorical way in which others can gain access to 
us.  They can put themselves in “physical proximity,” to us where they are “close 
enough to touch or observe [us] through normal use of [their] senses.”36  
Gavison argues that the fact “that our spatial aloneness has diminished” is cause 
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for a potential privacy complaint.  If we accept the value-neutral notion of 
“perfect” privacy, then the mere fact of physical access on the part of others 
automatically counts as a diminishment of privacy.  Whether or not this is the 
case, the suggestion that spatial aloneness constitutes a part of the analytic core 
of personal privacy is an intriguing, controversial, but I will argue, an ultimately 
mistaken, hypothesis. 
Gavison claims that a diverse list of privacy violations can be most clearly 
appreciated in terms of illegitimate physical access to an individual. 
The following situations involving loss of privacy can 
best be understood in terms of physical access: (a) a 
stranger who gains entrance to a woman’s home on 
false pretenses in order to watch her giving birth; (b) 
Peeping Toms; (c) a stranger who sits on “our” 
bench, even though the park is full of empty benches; 
and (d) a move from a single-person office to a much 
larger one that must be shared with a colleague.  In 
each of these cases, the essence of the complaint is 
not that more information about us has been 
acquired, nor more attention has been drawn to us, 
but that our spatial aloneness has been diminished.37 
I fully agree with the observation that the acquisition of personal information has 
nothing to do with the essential nature of the privacy loss in any of these 
examples.  I am far from convinced, however, that the diminishment of spatial 
aloneness takes us very far, either. 
Take the case of the Peeping Tom.  Do victims truly feel violated because 
others had gained close physical access to them?  I very much doubt that this is 
the case.  It is of course possible, that in certain very specific contexts spatial 
considerations exacerbate the feeling of unease.  But, in general, doesn’t the 
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offense have more to do with the thoughts and attitudes of the voyeur, and not 
his spatial location?  By Gavison’s own criteria of close “physical proximity,” the 
voyeur who peeks through the window via a telescope does not diminish spatial 
aloneness. 
The ability to watch and listen, however, is not in 
itself an indication of physical access, because Y can 
watch X from a distance or wiretap X’s telephone.  
This explains why it is much easier for X to know that 
Y has physical access to him then when Y observes 
him.38 
This has very puzzling consequences.  The victim of the Peeping Tom who has 
her privacy compromised by having her window peeked through has had her 
spatial aloneness compromised.  But the victim who is spied upon from up the 
hill via a very powerful telescope does not suffer this same loss of solitude.  But 
the latter victim’s privacy has clearly been violated.  The only one of Gavison’s 
characteristics that potentially covers her complaint is that she has illegitimately 
become the object of the voyeur’s attention.  But, isn’t this really a better 
account of the first victim’s moral outrage, as well? 
Characteristic Three—Attention paid to an individual.  The 
characteristic of privacy that I will argue is the most important component in 
Gavison’s analysis receives slight attention within the discussion.  She introduces 
the affective notion of attention from others in a very suggestive passage. 
An individual always loses privacy when he becomes 
the subject of attention.  This will be true whether the 
attention is conscious and purposeful, or inadvertent.  
Attention is a primary way of acquiring information, 
and is sometimes essential to such acquisition, but 
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attention alone will cause a loss of privacy even if no 
new information becomes known.39 
Professor Gavison is very careful to qualify the connection between attention and 
the acquisition of personal information with the language of “primary way,” and 
“sometimes.” It is not that much of a stretch, however, to wonder if there is not 
some stronger connection between the concepts.  Perhaps knowing certain sorts 
of information about an individual always constitutes a form of paying attention 
to that person.  Don’t I pay attention to Madonna when I read the sleazy article? 
Although the discussion is getting ahead of itself, I am raising the question of 
whether the notion of the attention of others is really independent from the 
notion knowledge about others. 
The strategy that is emerging is to call into question Gavison’s claim that 
her privacy characteristics are logically independent and irreducible.  We have 
seen in the case of the love letters that what she takes to be a central case of a 
privacy violation in terms of information known about another can not only be 
reduced to a case of attention paid to an individual, but in fact, more plausibly 
be so characterized.  In a similar vain, the case of the Peeping Tom, reduced 
with greater normative insight from an instance of physical access to an 
individual to one of attention being illegitimately paid.  To make good on the 
stronger hypothesis to be offered in the next section, I will need to convince my 
readers that all cases, of informational violations of privacy, and not just a few 
convenient ones, can be reduced to illegitimate attention being paid to an 
individual.  And also, that all instances of loss of privacy resulting from physical 
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access to an individual can plausibly be re-characterized as cases in terms of 
illegitimate attention by others. 
VI.  Immunity from the Focused Attention of Others 
 
Private” used in this .  .  .  immunity-claiming way is 
both norm-dependent and norm-invoking.  It is norm 
dependent because private affairs and private rooms 
cannot be identified without some reference to 
norms.  So any definition of the concept of “private 
affairs” must presuppose the existence of some 
norms restricting unlicenced observation, reporting, or 
entry, even though no norm in particular is necessary 
to the concept.  It is norm-invoking in that one need 
say no more than “This is a private matter” to claim 
that anyone not invited to concern himself with it 
ought to stay out of it.40 
A.  Norm-dependent Concepts 
 
To leave all reference to values out of a conceptual model of a normative 
notion can result, not in normative neutrality, but an impoverished conceptual 
picture.  Stanley Benn gets it exactly right above when he observes that the 
concept of privacy allows us to claim a certain kind of norm-dependent immunity 
from others.  The exact nature of this immunity is, of course, still a matter 
dispute.  We have seen that many scholars have seen it as an immunity from the 
knowledge of others.  Other theorists have articulated the prerogative as an 
immunity from the judgment of others.  And, although she eschews anything 
that is not strictly value-neutral, Ruth Gavison’s model treats personal privacy as 
an immunity from the access of others. 
The implicit appeal to preexisting norms becomes clear when we see that, 
at least in the case of immunity from knowledge, or immunity from judgment, no 
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serious scholar has suggested any thing like a blanket immunity.  Obviously we 
possess all sorts personal information, and know quite a bit, about others 
without violating their privacy.  And we clearly form all sorts of judgments about 
others, both positive and negative, without compromising their privacy.  Thus, if 
privacy consists of an immunity from knowledge or judgment, it is only within 
certain very specific and largely culturally defined areas of a person’s life.  We 
can make this disguised appeal to existing norms explicit by recognizing that an 
implicit decision as to what is legitimate and illegitimate underlies appropriate 
uses of the concept of privacy.  All of this suggests a pattern for theoretical 
models of privacy.  Rather than defining privacy in terms of some general 
immunity, X, it will be more perspicuous to characterize it as an immunity from 
illegitimate instances of X.
Ruth Gavison was insistent that her conceptual definition eschew any use 
of value-laden components.  Her mistake, I would argue, was not her admirable 
desire for a non-question-begging model, but in ignoring the value-dependence 
of the concept she was analyzing.  Her central insights become much more 
plausible when privacy is recast as an immunity from the illegitimate access of 
others.  The three characteristics she identifies as independent aspects of 
personal privacy also gain increased plausibility when they are articulated as 
limited areas of immunity - thus, immunity from illegitimate information being 
known by others, immunity from the illegitimate attention of others, and 
immunity from illegitimate physical access by others.  Such a reformulation of 
the access model completely does away with the need for the artificial, and I 
45
think misleading, notion of perfect privacy.  But at the same time, it allows us to 
see how complete physical inaccessibility would contingently guarantee that 
there was no form of illegitimate access on the part of others. 
B.  No One’s Business 
 
James Rachels suggests that we would be well-advised to more seriously 
investigate the colloquial expression, “none of your business,” for conceptual 
clues regarding personal privacy. 
A woman may rightfully be upset if her credit-rating is 
adversely affected by a report about her sexual 
behavior because the use of such information is 
unfair; however, she may also object to the report 
simply because she feels - as most of us do - that her 
sex life is nobody else’s business. This, I think, is an 
extremely important point.  We have a “sense of 
privacy” which is violated in such affairs, and this 
sense of privacy cannot adequately be explained 
merely in terms of our fear of being embarrassed or 
disadvantaged in one of these obvious ways.  An 
adequate account of privacy should help us 
understand what makes something “someone’s 
business” and why intrusions into things that are 
“none of your business” are, as such, offensive.41 
I would argue that the “none of your business” test does at least as good a job 
of delineating the bounds of personal privacy as any of the sophisticated 
analyses considered so far. 
Judith DeCew demurred the possibility of producing a unitary model of 
privacy, but I think she has actually managed to articulate one of the most 
promising candidates in the literature - one that fits quite nicely with the none of 
your business insight. 
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I [have] developed a proposal that takes the realm of 
the private to be whatever is not, according to a 
reasonable person in normal circumstances, the 
legitimate concern of others.  Clearly, the proposal as 
it stands is vague and overbroad.42 
One philosopher’s vagueness and over-breadth, it appears, is another’s helpful 
insight.  Reflection on psychological activity that colloquial speech characterizes 
as concerning ourselves with another holds great promise as analytical device for 
probing the contours of personal privacy. 
What is it to concern ourselves with another?  What is it for others to 
make our business theirs?   A cinemagraphic metaphor is helpful here.  There is 
a kind of zooming in, or tightening of cognitive and emotional focus.  The 
cocktail party is crowded and noisy; I hear random bits of several scattered 
conversations.  All of the sudden I am struck with your animated exchange with 
your lover.  I move in and actively listen to what you’re discussing.  I have 
concerned myself with your particular conversation; I’ve made it my business.  
And, of course, in the context imagined, I have done all of this quite 
illegitimately. 
C.  The Focused Attention of Others 
 
Information models of privacy postulate what I have called an 
epistemological relationship between the individual enjoying the immunity 
afforded by privacy conventions and others who would potentially violate that 
immunity.  For Gavison the relationship is a spatial one, with concepts of 
distance, and spatial and sensory barriers, lurking in the background.  One of the 
advantages I would still claim for the judgment of others model is that it recast 
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the privacy relationship in much more candidly affective terms.  Individuals were 
seen as enjoying immunity from certain kinds of conscious thoughts and 
attitudes on the part of others.  It turned out, of course, that the notion of 
judgment was too narrow to capture all of the illegitimate thoughts and attitudes 
through which others might violate another’s privacy. 
With a candid acknowledgment that the original inspiration came from 
Gavison’s characteristic of attention of others, I would like to propose the 
following as the single conceptual core of personal privacy.43 Privacy 
demarcates those areas of people’s lives where they are granted - both 
by cultural norms and legal traditions - limited immunity from the 
focused attention of others. I put this forward not in the classical tradition of 
a single necessary and sufficient condition, but as an explanatory hypothesis.  
Immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others as a rubric for 
personal privacy provides, I claim, the simplest, most complete, non-ad hoc,
account; it is for these reasons the most plausible model. 
As anyone who has ever put forward an interpretive theory knows, it is 
much easier to attack one’s rivals, than to construct a positive defense.  I can 
think of no other way of proceeding than reassemble the clear cases of personal 
privacy, and privacy violations, and then see whether the attention of others 
model successfully captures the central concerns. 
• Others illegitimately gain access to your medical or financial 
records. 
 
• Others illegitimately publish the above information. 
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• Others search or monitor your office, but find nothing. 
 
• Another peeps in your window. 
 
• Another lectures you on personal decisions you have made. 
 
• Another [a state actor] unreasonably searches you. 
 
• Another [the state] illegitimately interferes with an intimate and 
“fundamentally important” personal decision. 
 
Illegitimate access to, and the publication of, sensitive personal records, 
of course, deal with the ever present concepts of personal knowledge and 
information.  I take it that there is nothing artificial or ad hoc in postulating a 
concern with the illegitimate focused attention of others as underlying our 
privacy concerns in connection to the forbidden acquisition and dissemination of 
personal information.  The failed office monitoring reminds us, again, that mere 
attempts to acquire information involve an active focusing of attention by others; 
from which we may be granted some limited immunity.  Voyeurism shows how 
our privacy can be compromised via the standard sensory means by which we 
gather much of our knowledge and yet have little to do with the gathering of 
information - our culture and legal system protects us from these non-
informational instances of focused attention by others, nevertheless.  A general, 
though at the same time very limited, immunity, not just from the knowledge of 
others, or the physical access of others, but the attitudes of others, allows to 
fully appreciate instances of illegitimate judgment and meddling in another’s 
personal affairs such as the overbearing mentor.  He focuses his attention on his 
research assistant - her person, her life, and her intimate decisions - in ways that 
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clearly violate our culture’s norms.  We see that these concerns can be captured 
by the concept of personal privacy, not just because they can plausibly be recast 
as areas of immunity from focused attention, but also by how naturally the 
expression, “none of his business,” applies.  The last instance from the brief 
inventory above that falls within the immunity from the illegitimate focused 
attention of others with complete ease, are instances of unreasonable state 
searches.  In ways strongly analogous to those in which individuals can focus 
their attention on you to gather information, or simply to snoop, government can 
also focus its attention on individual citizens.  The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution happily guarantees its citizens immunity from such 
attention in the form of “unreasonable”searches and seizures.   
D.  Fourteenth Amendment Privacy 
 
A serious challenge for the immunity from the focused attention of others 
is, perhaps, presented by instances of Due Process privacy.  It is matter of 
considerable disagreement whether the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,44 or the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee citizens a right to 
make fundamentally important personal decisions.  Justice Brennan was only one 
of the many justices who believed that it did. 
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to 
bear or beget a child.45 
Other distinguished jurists, of course, have seen the matter very differently. 
 
50
The Court talks about a constitutional “right of 
privacy” as though there is some constitutional 
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be 
passed which might abridge the “privacy” of 
individuals.  But there is not.  .  .  .  I like my privacy 
as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless 
compelled to admit that government has a right to 
invade it unless prohibited by some specific 
constitutional provision.46 
Several privacy scholars have suggested that so called “decisional” privacy 
is at best a derivative or metaphorical notion, and at worst a simple linguistic 
mistake.  Thus, Parent, from his perspective of semantic legislation is emphatic. 
[A] person who is prohibited by law from making 
certain choices should be described as having been 
denied liberty or freedom to make them.  .  .  .  [W]e 
can meaningfully say that the right to liberty 
embraces in part the right of persons to make 
fundamentally important choices about their lives and 
therewith to exercise significant control over different 
aspects of their behavior.  [This] is clearly 
distinguishable from the right of privacy which the 
condemns unwarranted acquisition of undocumented 
personal knowledge.47 
Ruth Gavison is less the semantic legislator, but argues much the same position 
in terms of conceptual and jurisprudential clarity. 
 
[I]dentifying privacy as noninterference with private 
action, often in order to avoid an explicit return to 
“substantive due process,” may obscure the nature of 
the legal decision and draw attention away from 
important considerations.  The limit of state 
interference with individual action is an important 
question that has been with us for centuries.  The 
usual terminology for dealing with this question is 
that of “liberty of action.” It may well be that some 
cases pose a stronger claim for noninterference than 
others, and that the intimate nature of certain 
decisions affects these limits.  This does not justify 
naming this set of concerns “privacy,” however.  A 
better way to deal with these issues may be to treat 
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them as involving questions of liberty, in which 
enforcement may raise difficult privacy issues.(52)
Although there is a clear difference between the sort of immunity from 
state attention that the Fourth Amendment affords citizens, and the immunity 
from state interference recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, I think it is entirely appropriate to use the concept of privacy to 
describe both of them.  For one thing, it quite natural to respond to the state’s 
concerns with contraception, abortion decisions, choices about the end of one’s 
life, and issues of sexual intimacy, with the dismissal that it is none of their 
business.  And, indeed, those on the other side of these substantive 
controversies implicitly respond in terms of personal privacy, arguing that the 
protection of fetal life, or the state’s interest in prohibiting homosexual sodomy, 
are precisely the sorts of thing that democratic governments should concern 
themselves with.  I am an unashamed partisan on these questions; I am 
convinced they are unquestionably none of the state’s business.  But I fully 
recognize that equally reflective people see these matters differently.  In the 
present context, I am simply trying to locate the conceptual home for our 
debate, and describing it as a disagreement over the parameters of Fourteenth 
Amendment privacy seems linguistically true. 
There are at least two ways in which government can focus its attention, 
and sometimes its illegitimate attention, on its citizens.  The first, of course, is in 
ways analogous to tabloid reporters, snoops, and voyeurs.  It can single you out 
as a person; tapping your phone, investigating your banking records, or 
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searching your car.  The state can also focus its attention on you because you 
fall within a group engaged in a kind of behavior.  Government focuses, for 
example, on speeders, passing laws restricting choices to drive beyond 
prescribed limits.  Almost all of us concede that this is a quite legitimate instance 
of focused attention.  We are much less comfortable, however, when the 
attention focuses on choices that are “fundamentally important” and intimate - 
such as those dealing with reproduction, pregnancy, sexuality, and death. 
E.  Focused Attention and Spatial Aloneness 
 
In the course of defending her access model of privacy, Ruth Gavison 
included the little laundry list of instances where individuals’ privacy was clearly 
compromised that I have already quoted.48 One of her examples is a potentially 
serious problem for the immunity from focused attention model. 
The following situation[] involving loss of privacy can 
best be understood in terms of physical access .  .  .  
a stranger who chooses to sit on “our” bench, even 
thought the park is full of empty benches.(54)
The first thing that must be conceded is how natural it is to use the rubric of 
privacy to articulate the normative concerns raised in this example.  You and I 
are in the park together on the bench.  Perhaps we are lovers and our 
conversation is intimate; perhaps we are colleagues and the discussion is 
professional; or perhaps we are casual acquaintances and talking about last 
night’s ball game.  When the stranger chooses “our” bench over all the empty 
ones we are on alert and offended.  Why?  If my analysis of privacy is correct, 
our moral complaint must concentrate on the stranger’s focused attention on us.  
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We suspect he has focused on us.  Why else has he chosen “our” bench?  We 
worry that he will further focus on our conversation.  All of this focused 
attention, actual and potential, is quite illegitimate in our cultural context. 
But isn’t this a little strained?  Gavison claims that the mere condition of 
his physical access, regardless of imputed motives or other psychological states 
of the stranger, is enough to trigger privacy concerns.  I certainly want to 
concede that there are complicated and mysterious conventions concerning 
interpersonal distance and other spatial considerations in our culture.  Anyone 
who has spoken with people from different cultures with different “conversational 
distances,” or simply individuals who are insensitive to our conventions, knows 
that too much, and particularly too little, distance can be quite unsettling.  The 
park example gains part of its punch, not so much from privacy conventions, but 
from other spatial conventions that we all recognize, even if we find them 
difficult to articulate. 
I think we see that psychological features like focused attention are 
central to our privacy concerns by imagining them to be absent in the stranger 
scenario.  Suppose that he is lonely, speaks not a word of English, and simply 
desires closeness.  Even if we are still somewhat uncomfortable, the fact that our 
conversation is not the focus of his attention, certainly alleviates some of our 
privacy concerns.  What if he’s blind and deaf, and was completely unaware that 
we were sitting on “his” bench?  Could the stranger accidentally violate our 
privacy?  On Gavison’s spatial access model perhaps he could.  But I would 
argue that accidental violations of personal privacy, at least in the present 
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context, make no sense.  And, indeed, the necessity for some kind of intent 
becomes an argument for the illegitimate focused attention perspective, since 
the psychological, and perhaps normative, intentions of privacy violators 
emerges as part of meaning of a privacy violation.  And this is just what we 
should expect, given the norm dependence of the concept of privacy.  
VI.  Two Approaches to Rules 
[I]s privacy's value best described in consequentialist 
or deontological terms?  Case law mentions that 
privacy is valuable for such diverse purposes as 
"promotion of free discourse," "to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness," "leading lives 
in health and safety" in the home, "to keep secret or 
intimate facts about oneself from the preying eyes of 
ears of others," and the promotion of personal 
relationships.  With claims such as these, the courts 
suggest that privacy is valuable because of its 
desirable consequences.  Yet there is also a 
deontological strand in legal privacy theory.  The law 
contains suggestions that privacy's value stems from 
respect for "man's spiritual nature," "individual 
dignity," and "inviolate personality." Since a 
consequentialist account of privacy's value will 
ultimately clash with a deontological account, we 
must arbitrate between them if we decide that privacy 
does possess an independent value.49 
The history of normative thought teaches that consequentialist 
justifications of moral positions must forever be at war with deontological 
defenses.  Much of academic law seems to have bought into a similar approach 
to legal rules.  This curious since scholars have long noticed that rules - in 
games, legal contexts, or basic ethical principles - can be examined from both a 
forward looking perspective the assesses the future consequences of new rules 
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and changes to existing rules, and a backward looking perspective that seeks to 
correct injustice and unfairness.   
John Rawls illustrated this important point about rules with the classic 
example of legal punishment. 
One can say, then, that the judge and the legislator 
stand in different positions and look in different 
directions: one to the past, the other to the future.  
The justification of what the judge does, qua judge, 
sounds like the retributive view; the justification of 
what the (ideal) legislator does, qua legislator, sounds 
like the utilitarian view.  Thus both sides have a point 
(this is as it should be since intelligent and sensitive 
persons have been on both sides of the argument); 
and one's initial confusion disappears once one sees 
that these views apply to persons holding different 
offices and duties, and situated differently with 
respect to the system of rules that make up the 
criminal law.50 
Rawls' distinction between a rule administrator's perspective on rules, and a 
policy maker's perspective is both insightful, and misleading.  The umpire has no 
choice but to call the batter our on the third strike, the rules clearly state what is 
to be done, and her job is to see to it that balls and strikes are determined, and 
that the rules are carried out.  It makes no difference if all sorts of good 
consequences would follow from allowing this particular batter to have four 
strikes.  But when the Rules Committee meets to consider changes in the rules – 
should the designated hitter rule be standardized?, or done away with? –  
potential good and bad effects of the changes dominate the discussion. 
Even as much of judicial activist as Dworkin admits that most judicial work 
involves easy cases.51 Jurisprudential questions about what the law is get the 
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scholarly attention, but most of a judge's time is spent like the umpire 
determining balls and strikes and sending players to first base or back to the 
dugout based on these calls.  One need not be a conservative to believe that a 
judge's first responsibility is to interpret and administer existing law, not to make 
new law.  Legislators, however, are supposed to make new and better laws.  It is 
hard to imagine how they could adequately exercise this responsibility without 
paying primary attention to the social, financial, and perhaps legal effects of their 
proposed changes and creations.  Utilitarian questions like the deterrent effect of 
some proposed increase in punishment, or potential gains in economic efficiency 
resulting from common law changes in accident law, do sound a lot like the sorts 
of things that policy makers like the members of the rules committee, or elected 
legislators, should be asking themselves.  Deontological questions, however, like 
what punishment does this convicted criminal deserve, or what is the fairest 
settlement of this particular law suit, sound more like the umpire making tough 
calls - ball or strike, fair or foul, out our safe - but working within a context 
where the rules are already spelled out.   
This tidy compartmentalization is compromised, however, by a number of 
practical and legal considerations.  First, of course, is the simple fact that both 
judges and legislators are human beings who think and act both inside and 
outside their institutional roles at the same time.  Judges can be fully aware of 
what the law is, yet still be concerned with the economic, social, and legal 
consequences of their decisions.  Indeed, we would be disappointed were they 
not.  Similarly, a legislator's vote on a crucial bill may be every much as 
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dependant on his sense of what is just and fair as it is on any utilitarian 
calculation of the potential consequences of the proposed legislation.  Rule 
administrators, as well as rule makes, will therefore be doomed to contemplate 
their actions from both the forward-looking perspective, and the backward-
looking perspective, at the same time.   
Most damaging of all to the Rawlsian taxonomy, however, is that the most 
perplexing questions about rules fall in between the stark extremes of decisions 
to have a rule or not, and decisions about what the rule dictates.  Consider the 
contemporary debate about capital punishment.  We have pretty clear moral 
rules about killing people.  These moral rules have always been enshrined in 
criminal law.  Utilitarian arguments - deterrence, public safety, the avoidance of 
private revenge - have always been a part of the moral and policy defense of the 
rules proscribing criminal homicide.  Within specific jurisdictions the rules 
articulate maximum criminal penalties.  A judge's potential sentence is bound by 
these existing rules.  But, what happens when the debate is not about whether 
we should have rules against murder, but what the maximum punishment should 
be?  Rawls is uneqivocal. 
The decision whether or not to use law rather than 
some other mechanism of social control, and the 
decision as to what laws to have and what 
penalties to assign, may be settled by utilitarian 
arguments.52 
Such an emphatic assignment of the creation and change of criminal penalties to 
utilitarian policy making may seem surprising coming from a philosopher who 
would be one of the most outspoken critics of utilitarianism, but very much in 
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keeping with the spirit of the early 1950s where utilitarian thinking dominated 
criminology.  In the contemporary debate about capital punishment, however, 
the Rawlsian assignment seems both artificial and normatively misleading.  
Consequentialist considerations – is the death penalty a more effect deterrent to 
murder than lengthy prison sentences?, what is the cost of an average execution 
compared to life imprisonment?, etc. – play a huge part in the debate.  But it is 
painfully obvious that retributive arguments, along with other considerations of 
procedural and corrective justice, play an equally dominant role – what should be 
the ultimate price for first-degree murder?, is capital punishment administered in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner? 
When all is said and done, I would argue, the safest response is to simply 
acknowledge that both backward-looking and forward-looking arguments have 
always played legitimate roles in our thinking about moral and legal rules.  Our 
task is not some grand ontological theory about moral truth, but a better 
understanding of how we think – as human beings and as members of this 
culture – about these questions.  When the issue is our privacy, our immunity 
form the illegitimate focused attention of others, it is obvious to me that both 
backward-looking and forward-looking considerations will be integral parts of a 
full understanding of the normative importance of privacy. 
VII.  Forward-Looking Justifications of Privacy 
[The right to privacy] deals .  .  .  with a cluster of 
immunities which, if acknowledged, curb the freedom 
of others to do things that are generally quite 
innocent if done to objects other than persons, and 
even to persons, if done with their permission.  There 
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is nothing intrinsically objectionable in observing the 
world, including its inhabitants, and in sharing one's 
discoveries with anyone who finds them interesting; 
and this is not on account of any special claims, for 
instance, for scientific curiosity, or for a public interest 
in the discovery of truth.  For I take it as a 
fundamental principle in morals a general liberty to do 
whatever one chooses unless someone else has a 
good reasons for interfering to prevent it .  .  .  The 
onus of justification, in brief, lies on the advocate of 
restraint, not on the person restrained.53 
A.  Rules, Liberty, and the Focused  Attention of Others 
 
Rules constrain free choice.  The umpire must send the batter to first base 
after ball four, the rules say so.  I must drive on the right side of the road even 
though the address I am looking for is more easily seen from the left.  Failure to 
respect privacy limit may your options by focusing my illegitimate attention on 
you.  Stanley Benn postulated a fundamental normative principle that the onus 
lies with proponents of rules that limit free choice, and this seems exactly right.  
The policy maker, or the anthropologist trying to reconstruct a functional account 
of social norms, is most likely to appeal to good consequences brought about by 
the rules, even though they limit options.  We value freedom, but constrain it in 
certain ways because the constraints make the world better than it would 
otherwise be.  This is the logic of the classical social contract, cutting-edge 
economics of law, and the solution to the prisoner's dilemma.  Even when the 
normative considerations in favor of adopting the rules are articulated in 
deontological terms like justice or respect for persons, the argument still has a 
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forward-looking flavor to it.  The world will be better in the future with the rules, 
than it was in the past without them. 
The forward-looking calculations that would justify rules granting 
individuals immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others will have to 
very compelling.  Focusing attention on another is not simply an idle choice like 
deciding to ware a Hawaiian shirt rather than a plaid one.  We are all, to some 
degree, voyeurs and gossips.  Cultures vary in their judgments about the 
seriousness and parameters of "observing the world, including its inhabitants, 
and sharing one's discoveries with anyone who finds them interesting," but all 
cultures recognize that people do these things.  Thus, privacy rules seek to 
constrain a very natural human tendency that we all have to focus attention on 
others.  If this were not challenging enough, the focused attention of others has 
clear good consequences for society as a whole.  What others know and think 
about us obviously affects our behavior.  It significantly improves the chances we 
will do the morally correct thing, the thing that the law requires.  Nevertheless, 
most of us recognize that regardless of how natural it is to disregard privacy, and 
how inconvenient privacy rules may be when it comes to fighting crime or a 
“war” on terror; rules demarcating areas of immunity from the focused attention 
of others are important enough to outweigh these counter forces. 
B.  Pain and the Attention of Others 
I assume that victims of privacy violations typically experience tangible 
psychological pain.  Some might argue that this pain is a cultural artifact, and 
that there are, or at least we can imagine there might be, cultures where none of 
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the things we treat as private would be seen as in any way sensitive or intimate.  
Perhaps we can imagine societies.  So what?  Three things pain me as I am 
writing this section.  A tooth is bothering me, and I fear a visit to the dentist is in 
order.  The chronic ache in my left knee is acting up, and short of surgery, 
aspirin will have to do.  And I'm having a big fight with my bosses about 
retaining a position in my department, and it's driving me crazy.  The first two 
instances of pain are well-understood physiological occurrences that no doubt 
have evolutionary explanations.  The last is an all too familiar example of 
contemporary capitalist and corporate culture, with a twist that is somewhat 
idiosyncratic to the academy.  There is nothing intrinsically pain inducing about a 
resource being reallocated within an organization.  I am smart enough to realize 
that from a purely selfish perspective, the change has almost no effect on my 
job.  Issues of departmental prestige, and probably unfair worries about arbitrary 
and vindictive administrative decisions, are in no sense a natural part of a human 
being's biological existence.  But, again, so what?  If you ask me which pain I 
would most like to rid myself of, there's no question.  The unfairness of the 
decision gnaws at me - it upsets my stomach, causes me to lose sleep, and just 
plain bums me out - while the discomfort from the tooth and knee easily recede 
to the background.  The fact that it has a psycho-social origin, rather than a 
physiological one, is irrelevant from my phenomenological perspective. 
I suspect, however, that responding to illegitimate focused attention with 
alarm, discomfort, and pain, might actually have an ancient biological origin.  
And other privacy scholars have had similar intuitions .  Alan Westin, for 
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example, writing over a generation and a half ago offered a very contemporary 
sounding socio-biological account of privacy. 
Man likes to think that his desire for privacy is 
distinctively human, a function of his unique ethical, 
intellectual, and artistic needs.  Yet studies of animal 
behavior and social organization suggest that man's 
need for privacy may well be rooted in his animal 
origins, and that men and animals share several basic 
mechanisms for claiming privacy among their 
fellows.54 
It would be surprising were we not genetically predisposed to register the 
focused attention of others.  Many species are keenly aware of an individual 
organism's gaze within their own species - rivals and potential mates - and of the 
gaze of other species - predators and prey.  Within highly complex social species 
like our own, the biological advantages of heightened sensitivity to the attention 
of others becomes even more complicated and important.  One of the persistent 
problems, of course, for this kind of socio-biological hypotheses is how to 
marshal compelling evidence, a task that is certainly beyond my area of 
expertise.  Thus, I am reduced to thought-experiment and appeals to my 
readers' intuitions. 
Imagine that you are out to dinner and a rude stranger continues to stare 
at you.  Imagine that the voyeur watches you in an intimate moment.  Imagine 
that your finances or medical problems are published in the tabloids.  You are 
pained by this.  But is this simply a learned response on your part?  Now culture 
plays a part here, but is it the whole story?  A common misconception is that 
nature and nurture offer rival accounts of behavior and other phenotypical 
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characteristics.  But any evolutionary theorist will tell you that nature and nurture 
always work as partners in explaining anything of interest in the biological world.  
We know, for example, that the disposition to sing has clear genetic origins in 
song birds.  The fact remains, however, that they must learn how to sing.  If 
individuals are not exposed to the songs of their own species in their youth, they 
are doomed to the production of pitiful sounds that are at best a poor parody of 
the beautiful and individually unique compositions of their socially trained 
fellows.55 Our culture teaches us a lot about personal privacy.  I take that as a 
given.  But it is not unreasonable to speculate that the experience of pain that 
normal human beings experience when they are victims of illegitimate focused 
attention of others is partly biological.  And this will be true even if it is our 
culture that largely defines the boundaries of what is legitimate and illegitimate, 
and even if we are capable of learning to live with lots of focused attention in our 
daily lives. 
One clear reason, therefore, for circumscribing general liberty and placing 
moral and legal restrictions on certain kinds of focused attention is that it causes 
harm to others when their privacy is not respected.  We place moral, common 
law, and criminal restrictions on punching people in the nose largely because it 
hurts so damn much to be a victim of one of these punches.  It doesn't really 
matter whether the pain of being the victim of illegitimate focused attention is 
more like my frustrations with my bosses, or more like the songbird with a 
genetic predisposition to sing.  Whatever the origins of the pain we feel when 
our privacy is violated, a world that avoids this pain is much better than one that 
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allows it.  And, as with almost every insight in the privacy literature, this one's 
been around for a long time. 
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the 
heightening of sensations which came with the 
advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only 
a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in 
physical things.  Thoughts, emotions, and sensations 
demanded legal recognition.56 
C.  Privacy and Social and Political Freedom 
None of us would desire to live in a world of complete privacy.  I am not 
imagining, here, Gavison's perfect privacy, which we saw was nothing more than 
complete isolation.  Rather, the thought-experiment is one of total immunity 
from the focused attention of others.  The reason we would not want such 
immunity, of course, is that complete privacy seems a causally sufficient 
condition for complete freedom, and complete freedom sounds an awful lot like a 
Hobbesian state of nature.  None of us trust our comrades enough to grant them 
total freedom. 
This obvious line of thought has led some scholars to wonder just how 
normatively valuable privacy is in the first place.  Don't these immunities simply 
provide a shield that furthers the cause of crime, sexual and spousal abuse, and 
other sorts of social and moral evil?  It is undeniable that there is a tangible 
social cost to the robust recognition of areas of immunity from the judgment and 
focused attention of others.  People will, no doubt, take advantage of the privacy 
of their homes, or their relationships, or their conversations, or their e-mail 
exchanges, to do things that we not only wish they would not do, but which 
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moral and legal rules proscribe.  But most of us, including the most outspoken 
communitarian and feminist skeptics, see independent value in personal privacy.  
The reason is obvious.  The privacy which allows crime and wrong to take place 
away from the focused attention of the rest of us, also allows individual liberty 
and autonomy to flourish.  The world is better with some real privacy in it 
because the world is better when individuals have some genuine freedom. 
Forward-looking justifications of privacy in terms of freedom and 
autonomy are common in the literature.  The virtues of political and legal liberty 
have received the lion's share the scholarly attention.  This makes sense because 
the focused attention of government on an individual's behavior is so tangible.  
We all know how driving patterns on the interstate are changed when others see 
the trooper's patrol car.  Now speeding is a bad thing, and the focused attention 
of law enforcement on speeders is far from illegitimate, but when that same 
attention is focused on other aspects of our lives, most of us are uncomfortable.  
Government's attention is often judgmental - is this criminal, or subversive, or 
otherwise socially undesirable?  Most of this judgmental attention is a good 
thing; that's why we have the laws and police officers in the first place.  But 
liberal societies insist that individuals be granted certain areas of immunity from 
this official focused attention.  We grant these areas of legal, constitutional, and 
moral immunity at least in part because we value freedom and autonomy within 
these areas. 
As worrisome as the illegitimate focused attention of legal and political 
authority is, however, it is probably not the greatest threat to individual liberty.  
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This point has been made time and again in the literature, but remains all too 
easy to forget.  John Stuart Mill saw it clearly. 
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was 
at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as 
operating through the acts of the public autorities.  
But reflecting persons perceived that when society is 
itself the tyrant - society collectively over the separate 
individual who compose it - its means of tyrannizing 
are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the 
hands of its political functionaries.  Society can and 
does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right, of any mandates at all in 
things which it ought not to meddle, it practices a 
social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of 
political oppression, since, though not usually upheld 
by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of 
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the 
details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.57 
Mill's famous solution to the problem of tyranny of the majority was to articulate 
a limit on both social and legal mandates - the behavior and choices proscribed 
had to run a real danger of causing harm to others.  But Mill's problem from the 
very beginning was that almost any behavior has some potential harmful effect 
on others.  And since it is the majority who is doing the alleged tyrannizing, this 
majority of citizens have already registered their judgment that the proscribed 
behavior constitutes a tangible social threat.  Thus, Mill's protection evaporates 
to an empty limit on social and legal constraints on freedom and choice. 
Perhaps the recognition of personal privacy is a more efficient means of 
filtering out the inappropriate judgments and proscriptions of society.  Greater 
individual liberty and autonomy will exist in a society that recognizes immunity 
from the illegitimate focused attention of others.  This is precisely the forward-
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looking normative justification of personal privacy that was presented in 
Ferdinand Schoeman's insightful last work.58 He fully concedes the importance 
of a closely connected social arrangement that will necessarily include what I am 
calling the focused attention of others.  Such a society is necessary, among other 
things, for the very preconditions of liberty and autonomy. 
Much of what is most important about our life would 
be lost, would be inaccessible to us, were we 
uninfluenced - unpressured, if you will - by what we 
see around us.  Most, if not all, of our effectiveness 
as social agents would be undermined by the 
elimination of the kinds of pressures and influences 
that philosophers in the analytic tradition treat as 
rationally corrupting.  .  .  .  Most of our protections 
from a monolithic social and political tyranny depend 
on participation in associations.  The survival and 
effectiveness of these associations presuppose the 
availability of forces to bring about conformity with 
group norms - forces such as loyalty to group 
participants, methods, and ends.59 
Granted that social pressure is a good thing in both the culture as a 
whole, and in smaller associations like family and friends.  Focused attention 
helps produce adherence to group-defined norms.  At the same time, however, 
too much focused attention produces blind conformity and a loss of individual 
autonomy.  According to Schoeman, the most important function of personal 
privacy is to regulate the fine line between the appropriate social pressure that 
produces order and genuine associations, and the excessive social pressure that 
precludes freedom and autonomy.  And as important as it is to have immunity 
from legal and governmental pressure, immunity from a more amorphous social 
pressure is even more crucial to genuine social freedom and individual liberty. 
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I aim to understand the dimensions of privacy that 
arise in our social encounters.  I argue that privacy in 
the contexts of our social relations protects us from 
social overreaching - limits the control of others over 
our lives.60 
This sort of forward-looking functional account of the value of privacy 
conventions does not, of course, imply any sort of conscious awareness of the 
salutatory effects on the part of anyone.  The subtle forces of cultural selection, 
just like many of the factors in natural selection, may operate at levels far 
removed from the cultural and normative justifications familiar to most members 
of the society, or even to humanists and social scientists producing scholarly 
analyses of the conventions.  The beauty of an account such as Schoeman's 
"overreaching hypothesis" is that it allows us to get a glimmer of the cultural 
mechanisms that must have been at work, even though it is hard to imagine any 
conclusively confirming data to be discovered, or any crucial experiment to be 
conducted. 
X.  Backward-Looking Justifications of Privacy 
By insisting that there are personal boundaries that 
the state may not overstep, interior regions into 
which it cannot penetrate, liberalism expresses its 
respect for the inherent dignity, equality, individuality, 
interiority, and subjectivity of the individuals who 
compose it.  Inviolabiity is a form of equality; people 
who are less than equal are people who can be 
violated.  A liberal state respects the fact that each 
individual has some precious and incommensurable 
inner essence that must be protected from official 
scrutiny.61 
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A.  Backward-Looking Perspectives on Legal Rules 
Much of the literature on the moral significance of privacy seeks to expand 
on the forward-looking, or consequentialist, justifications just discussed.  Almost 
every theorist will grant that there is pain engendered by illegitimate focused 
attention, and that the absence of privacy is contingently related to diminished 
personal freedom and autonomy.  Many scholars, however, suggest that there is 
something deeper at stake in our concern with privacy.  The recognition of areas 
of immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others may result in a 
world where there is less pain, and more freedom, but this immunity has other, 
perhaps more profound, normative virtues.  The literature claims, for example, 
that privacy is connected with "man's spiritual nature,"62 that it provides "moral 
capital" for the formation of significant personal relationships like friendship and 
love,63 that it is fundamental to human intimacy,64 and it "is a social ritual by 
means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred."65 All of 
these fascinating, and often profound, normative analyses seem to me to have, 
despite their often explicit rejection of consequentialism, a forward-looking 
orientation to rules.  They all attempt to blend moral insights, facts about social 
psychology, and phenomenological reflections on privacy and its violation, and to 
then explain why a world that respects areas of limited immunity from the 
focused attention of others is better than a world without such privacy 
protection.  In a sense, however, they simply provide additional detail supporting 
the general forward-looking considerations of protecting individuals from pain, 
and facilitating greater personal autonomy and freedom. 
70
B.  Respect for Persons 
Kant's famous categorical imperative, in its second articulation, reads as 
follows. 
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person, or that of another, always as an end and 
never as a means only.66 
Kant recognized that there was something special, both psychologically and 
normatively, about human beings.  Simply in virtue of being a part of humanity, 
people are entitled to special moral consideration.  Although we all treat each 
other as means to our ends, the categorical imperative requires that we also 
treat one another as an "ends" as well.  We are required, so says Kant, to 
recognize that individuals are psychologically unique, having their own dreams 
and fears, and that they are agents acting out their own lives according to their 
own choices, values, and goals.  Human beings are persons, in a philosophically 
technical sense, and they are entitled to respect simply in virtue of this special 
characteristic of personhood. 
A number of contemporary scholars have suggested that the Kantian 
principle of respect for persons gets at the normative heart of personal privacy.67 
Granted there all sorts of forward-looking advantages to granting immunity from 
the focused attention of others, but the underlying moral claim is grounded on 
the simple fact that we are people, and that personal privacy is one of the rights 
we have for this reason alone. 
A principle of respect for persons is generated from 
an underlying notion of personhood.  Because a 
human possesses certain morally significant traits of 
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personhood, she is entitled to be treated with respect 
with regard to those traits.  These traits have been 
characterized in a variety of ways (e.g., self-
consciousness and moral agency), but the 
characteristic that has been brought to the forefront 
of privacy theory is the human capacity for rational 
choice.  Given that an agent possesses that capacity, 
it follows that she has a justified moral claim to being 
treated with the respect due to a person.68 
The Kantian insight is to some degree an empirical hypothesis.  Cognitive 
psychology, sociology, as well as common human experience, combine to tell a 
familiar story.  We are not only a conscious species, but a self-conscious one.  
We learn very early in life to be aware, not just of the world and the others who 
share it, but of ourselves, and what others are thinking about us.  The focused 
attention of others causes us us to become aware of ourselves.  This is often a 
good thing.  But there are occasions where its very bad indeed.  In the first 
place, it causes pain.  Secondly, it interferes with free agency.  Remember the 
interruption of traffic patterns on the interstate when drivers see the state patrol 
car, or reflect on your own disinclination to sing along with your favorite CD 
when others are present.  All of this, of course, is the forward-looking package of 
considerations that lie hidden in our cultural, and perhaps biological, history, and 
that at least partially explain the origins of our limited immunity from the 
illegitimate focused attention of others.  But the conventions, the normative 
rules, and the laws which codify this immunity are firmly in place now, and help 
to define what it is to be a full-fledged person in this culture.  Simply because of 
the kind of moral, social, and biological entities we are, we are worthy of respect 
and dignity, including limited sanctuary from the focused attention of others. 
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C.  Disrespect, Insult, and the Value of Privacy 
A common theme in the privacy literature is that the normative virtues of 
privacy can be articulated in terms of the backward-looking values of respect for 
persons and human dignity.  I want to exploit this insight by focusing on those 
cases where our privacy has been violated, and try to understand the moral 
attitudes of victims of illegitimate focused attention by others.  They were not 
accorded the respect that our culture demands for any human being.  They 
were, I suggest, insulted in a fundamental way that strikes at the heart of 
human dignity. 
Understanding privacy violations in terms of disrespect, insult, and the 
denial of basic dignity allows us to explain an number of puzzling features of 
personal privacy.  There are a range of different ways in which on can be the 
victim of illegitimate focused attention by others, and yet not suffer tangible 
economic or psychological damage.  One way is to be indifferent to the insult.  
My students may call me old fashioned and inflexible, intending it as an insult.  
But I may react with amusement, even pride.  My local supermarket probably 
focuses illegitimate attention on my grocery and liquor purchases by requiring 
the scanning of my "club card" in order to receive discounts.  In the right frame 
of mind, I could take great offense at this.  But as a matter of fact, I just don't 
care that much.  We are puzzled, even troubled, by victims of physical assault 
who don't defend their rights.  But we admire individuals who can laugh off the 
casual insults of their neighbors or fellow drivers.  I'm not suggesting that we 
should either be troubled by victims of illegitimate focused attention of others 
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who do not take offense, or that we should admire them.  We shouldn't be 
surprised, however, that there will be some real variance in the individual 
sensitivity to, and tolerance of, privacy violations. 
A second way that individuals can escape tangible loss when their privacy 
is violated is to be blind to the illegitimate focused attention.  Perhaps my 
colleagues continually insult me behind my back, but I am neither angered or 
saddened because I never find out.  One's privacy can egregiously be violated, 
yet suffer no pain or embarrassment, because of blissful ignorance.  Most of us 
have a strong intuition, however, that regardless of the absence of pain, self-
consciousness, or personal or professional disadvantage, victims of unknowing 
privacy violations have been wronged just the same. 
But respect for persons will sustain an objection even 
to secret watching, which may do no actual harm at 
all.  Covert observation-spying-is objectionable 
because it deliberately deceives a person about his 
world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his 
reasons, his attempts to make a rational choice.  .  .  .  
C is unaware of A.  .  .  .  the significance to him of 
his enterprise, assumed unobserved, is deliberately 
falsified by A.  He may be in a fool's paradise or a 
fool's hell; either way A is making a fool of him.69 
The disrespect hypothesis also beautifully accounts for the clear cultural 
component of personal privacy.  What actions, gestures, and words, constitute 
an insult is clearly a matter of convention.  This in no way softens the pain, or 
the moral importance, of the insult.  One can easily imagine a culture where 
raising the middle finger is understood to communicate - "You're number one, 
you're the best." Not in our culture, however.  The areas of our lives where we 
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expect immunity from the focused attention of others is no cultural, or biological, 
universal.  But given a particular culture where these expected areas of immunity 
exist, it is easy to see why the failure to honor this immunity counts as an attack 
on the victim's moral core. 
Finally, understanding privacy violations as egregious instances of 
disrespect that strike at the core of an individual's basic dignity allows us to see 
these insults can be so offensive, even though the person loses little.  The 
legislators in the state of Oregon a few years back floated the idea of requiring 
all state employees, including university professors, to submit to random drug 
tests as a condition of employment.  Now, no doubt, some of my colleagues had 
something to hide.  Their lifestyles were potentially threatened.  Their loss of 
privacy was going to result in a quite tangible personal loss, their job, or their 
chosen form of recreation.  For most of us on the faculty, however, the days 
were long since past when drug tests would disclose anything incriminating.  
Nevertheless, we all felt profoundly offended by the proposed policy.  How dare 
the state, our bosses, put us in a position of having to prove our innocence.  We 
felt that the contents of our bodily fluids was an extremely intimate area of our 
persons where we were entitled to immunity from the focused attention of 
others.  Most of us were troubled by this misguided potential policy, not because 
we had something to hide, but precisely because we were honest, hard-working, 
state employees, who felt that our employers owed us trust and respect. 
To violate a person's privacy, to illegitimately focus attention on protected 
areas of their lives, is to show them great personal disrespect.  It is to insult 
75
them, and in extreme cases, to subject them to a form of assault.  These 
violations often produce great personal pain.  But it is not the pain that makes 
them wrong from the backward looking perspective.  It is rather that because 
the violations are so clearly wrong, the victims often feel pain.  Privacy 
conventions establish a kind of trust between people.  Failing to respect these 
conventions is, therefore, a breaking of trust - a kind of cheating.  The voyeur, 
the paparazzi, the causal snoop, and the unscrupulous legal official, are engaged 
in an offensive form of injustice.  The rules exist, others play by them, and they 
have taken advantage of the rules for their own benefit, but have ignored them 
as applied to others.  Like all forms of moral offense, the backward looking 
perspective seeks some way of redressing this past injustice.  The sad truth is, of 
course, that contemporary American law's means of addressing these past 
violations of personal privacy - jail, civil damages, the exclusionary rule, etc.  - 
are all imperfect devices of rectifying the insult and assault that victims have 
experienced. 
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